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The Origin of the Czech and Slovak Pluralist Party Systems
Jan Bureš and Petr Just
Abstract: The article analyzes the process of pluralistic party system renewal 
in Czechoslovakia after the fall of communism in 1989. It shows the initial condi-
tions and major actors, as well as factors that infl uenced party system structure 
and behaviour in the environment of a post-communist society without a recent 
democratic tradition. Special attention is devoted to the differences between Czech 
and Slovak party systems, as both parts of the former united Czechoslovakia dem-
onstrated differences in their respective party systems both before and after 1989. 
After the introduction of key political parties, the results of 1990 general parlia-
mentary election and its impact on the party system are analyzed.
Keywords: Czech political parties, Slovak political parties, pluralist party 
systems, elections
The Czech and Slovak political party system immediately began to take shape in 
the fi rst days after the November 1989 revolution, and was concentrated into three 
fundamental political entities:
1) entities already existing before November 1989, which continued in the new 
regime (KSČ – Komunistická strana Československa, Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia; ČSS – Československá strana socialistická, Czechoslovak 
Socialist Party; ČSL – Československá strana lidová, Czechoslovak People’s 
Party, KSS – Komunistická strana Slovenska, Communist Party of Slova-
kia; SSO – Strana slovenskej obrody, Slovak Resurgence Party, and DS – 
Demokratická strana, Democratic Party)
2) entities that were revived after November 1989, and thus continued in 
the tradition of their pre-February 1948 or pre-WW2 activities (ČSSD – 
Československá sociální demokracie, Czechoslovak Social Democracy, 
and SNS – Slovenská národná strana, Slovak National Party), as well as 
entities that transformed themselves into political parties from originally 
dissident groups active during normalisation in Czechoslovakia (KAN 
– Klub angažovaných nestraníků, Club for Engaged Nonpartisans, ČSDI – 
Československá demokratická iniciativa, Czechoslovak Democratic Initia-
tive, HOS – Hnutí za občanskou svobodu – Movement for Civic Freedom)
3) Newly established “greenfi eld” political entities (OF – Občanské fórum, 
Civic Forum; HSD-SMS – Hnutí za samosprávnou demokracii – Společnost 
pro Moravu a Slezsko, Movement for Autonomous Democracy – Party for 
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Moravia and Silesia; SPR-RSČ – Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská 
strana Československa, Union for Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslo-
vakia; HDŽJ – Hnutí důchodců za životní jistoty, Pensioners’ Movement for 
Social Security; SZ – Strana zelených, Green Party; VPN – Verejnosť proti 
násiliu, Public against Violence; KDH – Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie, 
Christian-democratic Movement; MNI – Maďarská nezávislá iniciatíva, Hun-
garian Independent Initiative; MKDH – Maďarské kresťanskodemokratické 
hnutie, Hungarian Christian-democratic Movement; Spolužitie, the Coexist-
ence movement and so on)
The number of political parties being established increased quickly. While the 
tumultuous development of political entities attested to citizens’ awakening politi-
cal activity, on the other hand it also made diffi cult the creation of any kind of sta-
ble, functional model of party competition, which only strengthened the dominant 
position of the OF (Fiala – Herbut 2003: 16). The situation in Slovakia, where an 
additional player, the KDH, began to threaten the dominant position of the VPN, 
was slightly different. This party’s activities were the continuation of activity by 
the Christian dissent movement, which was much more active and signifi cant in 
Slovakia in the 1980s than civic dissent.
The general atmosphere before the elections was marked not only by the efforts 
of individual political entities to gain exposure among voters, but also by key indi-
vidual political events, which citizens could more or less follow on live telecasts: 
in particular the arguments by Federal Assembly MPs over the name of the state 
and the general raising of the question of constitutional organisation, including 
the fi rst signs of the potential independence of Slovakia, the demonstrations by 
Slovak nationalists against V. Havel in Bratislava, disputes among the political 
elite over vetting (vented in the Federal Assembly and broadcast live to society at 
large thanks to direct television broadcasts), the fate of the StB (Státní bezpečnost, 
Secret police) and the federal ministry of the interior, the beginning disputes over 
economic reform, anti-communist speeches by parts of the new political elite (e.g. 
Sokol’s suggestion in Prague to ban the activities of the KSČM /Komunistická stra-
na Čech a Moravy, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia/), disputes over 
the property of the Communist Party and the SSM (Socialistický svaz mládeže, 
Socialist Youth Union) and the opening of sore wounds from the modern history 
of Czechoslovakia by the media (crimes perpetrated by the communist regime in 
the 1950s, demands for the rehabilitation of victims and political prisoners and the 
Soviet occupation in 1968).
The Civic Forum and the Public against Violence parties, Občanské fórum (OF) 
and Verejnosť proti násiliu (VPN) respectively, both generally considered election 
favourites, perceived the political contest unambiguously as a plebiscite, choosing 
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between the old and a new regime, and presented themselves as a nationwide inclu-
sive movement for national reconstruction. The result of this was a marked limita-
tion of space for the function of other political entities, especially left-wing ones 
(Kunc 2000: 197).
June 1990 elections
Main candidate parties and movements, fundamental characteristics of 
election programmes
Five political parties and two democratic movements were functioning in Czecho-
slovakia immediately after November 1989; by the June 1990 elections there was 
a total of 66 registered political entities, of which 23 were running for the Federal 
Assembly or (Czech or Slovak) National Councils.
The majority of political entities entering the elections did not display the struc-
ture of classic parties as they are known in mature democracies. Generally these 
were conglomerations of parties and movements with similar orientation regarding 
the main social issues, and fundamentally targeting all voter groups.
Voters had only a minimal chance to assess the actual abilities of individual lead-
ers and candidates. The Civic Forum gained very wide support, in comparison to 
other political parties, by virtue of its fundamental strategy - to make the fi rst free 
elections a civic vote on democracy versus the old regime.
The programmes of the political parties were very similar, and in many basic 
questions relating to social development were identical. The programme goals of 
the majority of parties were more or less overlapping, which only made the situation 
less clear for voters. The highly generalised nature of the programmes of individual 
parties indicated the immaturity of civic society and party politics. The basic theses 
of the programmes were concentrated into several simple slogans. These revolved 
mainly around promises of the development of democracy, a socially and ecologi-
cally oriented market economy, the creation of a constitutional state, a vision of 
economic development, protection of the natural environment and the safeguard-
ing of national security. The concept of Czechoslovakia rejoining Europe and the 
idea of privatisation of state property were also frequently repeated. Refe rences to 
restitution of property were absent altogether. Social politics was also in a promi-
nent position for all parties, but was generally formulated only very vaguely. The 
issue of nationhood was a chapter in itself. It was a part of the programme for the 
majority of Slovak parties and the Moravian HSD-SMS. The Civic Forum ignored 
it altogether.
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Despite this great similarity between political programmes, in public opinion 
polls during the campaign more than half of the voters claimed that their decision 
was based most on political parties’ programmes (Krejčí 1994: 256) (infl uenced 
decision-making in the case of 90% of voters); in second place voters decided 
based on their trust in the representatives of the parties and movements (one fi fth of 
voters) (Krejčí 1994: 209).
The above-mentioned form of referendum about the past was characterised by 
sentences from the OF pre-election campaign: “Those who don’t vote for the OF are 
voting for the communists”, as well as a slogan diffi cult to understand for a mature 
pluralist democracy: “Parties are for partisans, the OF is for everyone.” The fi rst of 
these directly targeted a specifi c political entity. It deliberately simplifi ed a political 
battle between 23 political entities to the main rivals, symbolically representing 
that discord between the past and the future. This understandably intensifi ed the 
political confl ict, deliberately boxing the voter in and giving them the feeling that 
they were making a simple decision. This shortcut would later be used regularly 
in Czech politics (e.g. the ODS /Občanská demokratická strana, Civic Democratic 
Party/ slogan from the 1998 elections: “To the left or with Klaus”).
Civic Forum
The Civic Forum (Občanské fórum, OF) was led to the elections by Jan Urban, 
of whom it was generally known that he wanted to leave politics immediately after 
the elections. The real representatives of the OF however were primarily ministers 
of the federal and Czech government, or Federal Assembly and Czech National 
Council MPs, who found themselves on the candidate forms in individual electoral 
localities.
The OF electoral programme for the fi rst free elections, titled “Accepting respon-
sibility for our own future”, was based on a programme thesis which had already 
been approved by the OF assembly on 31st March, 1990. The programme was 
introduced by something of an accusation of the communist regime, and was ori-
ented towards the OF’s fundamental goals: to reintegrate Czechoslovakia to Europe 
(which was not understood primarily via the European Community and NATO but 
rather institutions originating from the Helsinki peace process) and to reform all 
components of public life. In the economic fi eld, the programme occupied a space 
that was delineated on one side by support of basic economic reforms (including 
privatisation, though by the method of selling company shares to its employees) and 
on the other by the necessity of maintaining social cohesion. While the programme 
included discussion of the renewal of the principles of private property, passages 
can also be found ascribing a signifi cant role within the market economy to prop-
erty ownership by towns, municipalities and co-operative organisations. Overall, 
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however, the electoral campaign was distinguished by a considerable intangibility, 
and, in the spirit of the revolutionary slogan “Parties are for partisans, the OF is for 
everyone”, was oriented at all strata of voters that did not want to continue on the 
path of the old regime. In terms of the main ideological groupings it is possible to 
fi nd two fundamental focal points: liberal and national (Krejčí 1994: 211)
Social democrats
The development of the relationship between the Civic Forum and social de-
mocracy, as an entity that after November 1989 tried to renew left-wing politics 
on a democratic foundation, was most interesting. The Social Democrats revived 
their activity immediately after the November revolution in 1989 and attempted to 
gain recognition as a historical party, which they supported partly by the fact that 
the ČSSD was the oldest classic Czech political party, and also with the argument 
that the party had operated uninterrupted, including during the period of manage-
ment in exile from 1948 to 1989. During the revival of this party there were great 
confl icts between domestic and exile factions, and further between supporters of 
close co-operation with the KSČ and supporters of a radical anti-communist line. 
Before the elections the name of Social Democracy (Sociální demokracie) thus 
covered the Czechoslovak Social-democratic Party (Čs. sociálně-demokratická 
strana), Czechoslovak Social Democracy (Čs. sociální demokracie) and the Social-
democrat Party (Sociálně-demokratická strana) in Slovakia. Rudolf Battěk and his 
followers in the Czechoslovak Social-democratic Party did not implement their 
right-wing positions, and so switched to the OF ticket.
The Civic Forum refused to recognise the ČSSD as a historic party, as they were 
afraid of the swift growth in its popularity as a party that could appeal to an already 
socially sensitive Czech society with a programme focused on a socially equita-
ble society. In addition to this the leaders of the Civic Forum expressed concerns 
that many previously discredited communists could switch to social democracy 
for career reasons, and with the help of this party quickly gain practical political 
experience. As on several other occasions in its history, the ČSSD this time went 
through the well worn dance regarding the ownership of its headquarters, Lidový 
dům (People’s House).
The representatives of the KSČ decided to return the social democratic party’s 
traditional headquarters, together with other property confi scated after February 
1948, to the party. The leaders of the OF Co-ordination Centre cast doubt upon the 
historical continuity of Horák’s post-revolution ČSSD with the pre-February social 
democrat party, and positioned themselves against the handing over of Lidový dům. 
It is of course necessary to add that Horák’s leadership did not itself act particularly 
strategically, as it succumbed to social pressure which the leadership of the Civic 
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Forum managed to evoke, and attempted to present social democracy as a centre-
right party.1 This in the atmosphere of a general disgust at the left, made it impossi-
ble for the social democrats to utilise the potential of supporting the ideals of social 
equity, which were always strongly present in Czech society.
Incidentally, the socialist and civic parties acted similarly in the electoral cam-
paign, vying to verbally reject everything associated with the left-wing foundations 
of the old regime. While the national socialists, in an attempt to deal with the domi-
nant position of the OF, tried to appeal to the Czech public with a programme of 
democratic socialism, the means by which they chose to do this (references to the 
authority of Edvard Beneš and Milada Horáková) proved to be excessively archaic.
The persistent efforts by Horák’s Social Democrats, the People’s Party and the 
National Socialists to distance themselves as vocally as possible from the old re-
gime culminated several days before the election in a joint appeal for the prohi-
bition of the activities of the Communist Party. The Civic Forum, aware of the 
legal, political (members of KSČ had until recently represented one tenth of the 
Czechoslovak population) and technical (it was not clear which institution had the 
right to adjudicate as to the banning of the activities of a political party) diffi culties 
inherent in the realisation of this step, not only refused this appeal, made by Jan 
Urban and President Václav Havel, as undemocratic, but also utilised it to weaken 
the political position of those suggesting it, when it publicly pointed out their pre-
revolution loyalty to the communist regime. The politicians of the OF argued that, 
in addition, in the case of the dissolution of the KSČ, the members of the abolished 
party would found another, which would thus lead only to a formal renaming, and 
in addition the members of a thus newly founded party would become victims of 
the new democratic regime, and could exploit the aura of martyrdom. Because KSČ 
was not banned, the space of the radical left remained clearly and distinctly legible.
The Communists
The main ideological opponent of the OF was the Communist Party of Czecho-
slovakia (KSČ – Komunistická strana Československa). The party consolidated 
at its convention in Olomouc, 20th–21st December 1989. It released a statement 
apologising to citizens for all injustices committed, accepting the abolition of its 
own armed units and accepted a new action programme, something of directive for 
the further activity of the party. It respected the principles of pluralist democracy, 
and also recognised private ownership. The party effected a partial federalisation 
of its structures before the election when on 31st March 1990 it established the 
1 Jiří Kunc even believes that the ČSSD during 1989–1992 severely damaged itself by the ac-
ceptance of the political ideal of a large coalition, which they supported with the example of 
governments in pan-national coalitions in the fi rst Czechoslovak Republic – cf.: Kunc 2000: 216.
Politics in Central Europe.indd   46 8.7.10   11:26
Politics in Central Europe 6 (June 2010) 1
47
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM – Komunistická strana Čech 
a Moravy) and the Communist party of Slovakia (KSS – Komunistická strana Slo-
venska). This act led to further progressive division of the party. In its electoral 
programme, the KSČ focused particularly on social issues, and presented itself as 
a barrier against unemployment and other maladies of capitalism. The Communist 
Party entered the elections as a unifi ed political entity, with a new cherry logo, and 
with a new building in Politických vězňů (Political Prisoners – sic!) Street.
Moravian movement
In the period when constitutional disputes between Czechs and Slovaks began 
to take shape, the Moravian movement, emphasising the historical rights of Mora-
via and Silesia, utilised the resultant atmosphere. The Movement for Autonomous 
Democracy – Party for Moravia and Silesia (HSD-SMS – Hnutí za samosprávnou 
demokracii – Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko) was established at a meeting of the 
Party for Moravia and Silesia in Kroměříž on 1st April 1990. This entity proclaimed 
itself to be a movement promoting the interests of the given region and uniting 
citizens on this regional principal.
In the so-called Moravia-Silesia Declaration (Moravskoslezská deklarace), the 
HSD-SMS called for the creation of a federal state of Bohemia, Moravia and 
Silesia, and Slovakia, and unequivocally rejected the bi-federal organisation of 
Czechoslovakia. Before the elections it even presented a proposal to the public 
on this matter, suggesting that the fi rst free elections be held only for the Federal 
Assembly and that, instead of an election to the Czech National Council, elec-
tions to a Czech parliament and a Moravian-Silesian parliament should be held 
later, alongside municipal elections. HSD-SMS also called for, among other things, 
the establishment of an autonomous federal nation of Moravia-Silesia, within the 
framework of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, with a provisional delega-
tion (until the election of a Moravian-Silesian parliament) of legislative authority 
at the Czech National Council (Springerová 2005: 43). This movement capitalised 
primarily on the newly awakened ideas of Moravian regionalism.
The high election results of HSD-SMS were, paradoxically, helped by an appeal 
by representatives of the OF (P. Pithart, V. Klaus), running for election in Moravia, 
to voters to not vote for small political parties (Springerová 2005: 43). HSD-SMS 
candidates responded to this with an appeal for voters in Moravia and Silesia to cast 
at least one vote in three (to the Chamber of the People of the Federal Assembly, 
Chamber of Nations of the Federal Assembly, and the Czech National Council) “for 
Moravia”. As a result of this targeted campaign, voters’ preference for HSD-SMS 
quickly grew, (from 3% on 15th May to 6% on 30th May) (Rak 1992: 209).
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The Czechoslovak People’s Party (ČSL – Československá strana lidová) joined 
with the Christian-democrat Party (KDS– Křesťanskodemokratická strana) before 
the elections, creating the Christian and Democratic Union (KDU – Křesťanská 
a demokratická unie). This coalition was the strongest centrist party, promoted the 
ideals of national understanding and built on the principles of solidarity and equal-
ity. The union of these two parties was, of course, not without problem, because the 
KDS, represented mainly by Václav Benda, was grounded fi rmly on anticommunist 
ideals, while ČSL was still only with diffi culty coming to terms with its collabora-
tional past from the times of the communist-dominated Národní Fronta (National 
Front) (Měchýř 1999: 183).
Pre-election voter preference
In the newly nascent democratic society, public opinion polls became a welcome 
novelty for citizens, to whom they had been denied before November 1989. Despite 
the fact that the methods of the fi rst poll agencies were still in their infancy, even 
these polls indicate much of interest about shifts in opinion within Czech society, 
and are really the only “hard” data from a period of general disorientation of socio-
economic interests and the political orientation of citizens.2
In the fi rst survey of 7th March 1990, the Civic Forum was preferred by 25% of 
voters. KSČ was in second place with 13%. Other parties, with minor differences, 
were under the 10% threshold. In Slovakia the VPN led with 18%, just in front of 
the KDH (17%) and the Greens (16%). The KSS and DS also had over 10%.
A signifi cant turning point came in April. In the Czech part of the republic and in 
Slovakia both main democratic groups – OF and VPN – lost approximately 4% of 
their supporters. Both Christian entities, KDU and KDH, grew in popularity. The 
Christian and democratic union (KDU) became the second most popular entity with 
the support of 15% of voters, and the KDH became the strongest party in Slovakia 
with 26%. A competition between these two groups was drawing near. The situa-
tion in the Czech part of the republic then changed again. While voter preference 
for OF grew, support for the KDU was unstable and decreasing. The apparent threat 
to the OF from the KDU at the beginning of the elections resulted in the attack by 
Jan Ruml on Josef Bartončík; he blamed him for co-operation with the Communist 
State Police. KSČ maintained the same voter support throughout. A mistrust of 
public opinion polls predominated among its voters. In the end, in comparison to 
the fi nal opinion poll, the KSČ gained a higher percentage of votes than predicated 
2 All results from public opinion pools are from Krejčí 1994: 240–242.
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by the fi nal opinion poll. The HSD-SMS strengthened signifi cantly in the last days 
of the campaign.
The greatest slump was experienced by the Green Party. In April it still had 13% 
of the vote in the Czech part of the republic. In the end it did not win seats in any 
representative body. It did not manage to clearly distinguish itself from the OF and 
in the sphere which was the party’s specialty – ecology – did not manage to outline 
a concrete programme.
According to surveys only 30% of the population stated that anyone had tried 
to personally infl uence their vote, which indicates quite impersonally managed 
electioneering. The candidates of the OF tried most to run a campaign of personal 
contact, personally contacting 13% of people questioned, KSČ candidates managed 
to contact 10%, KDU 7%, Green party 5% and ČSS 2%.
The pre-election campaign took place primarily in the media, and in particular 
on television. Political entities did not have any experience in managing campaigns 
and did not know how to target a concrete voter group. A specifi c role was certainly 
also played by inadequate technical support. According to voting regulations the 
length of the offi cial electoral campaign was set at 40 days, and ended 48 hours 
before the election.
Inexperience with managing electoral campaigns can also be observed in the 
statistics indicating the growing dissatisfaction of citizens with the development 
of the campaigns.a At the start of May 1990, 25% of those questioned expressed 
dissatisfaction, immediately after the elections this had risen to 45%, of whom 14% 
expressed outright disgust.
The most misapprehension was directed at the OF and VPN campaigns. The 
number of reservations increased in proportion to education. After the election, 
26% of those questioned believed that the type of campaign had played a decisive 
role in electoral preference, 36% thought that it likely had some effect, 26% thought 
that it probably had no effect and 12% thought that it defi nitely had no effect.
Also interesting is data about when citizens made their political choice. At the 
end of April 1990, 51% of those questioned had decided who they would vote for, 
a further 24% had decided in May, at the start of June another 19% and a fi nal 6% 
immediately before the elections. Hence shortly before the end of the electoral 
campaign a battle was being waged for a quarter of the votes. Of these, 40% de-
cided according to “the lesser evil”.
Election results
The fi rst free elections in Czechoslovakia after 44 years took place on Friday 8th 
and Saturday 9th June, 1990. Even the fi rst data from the election can be considered 
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a triumph of the new regime: voter turnout in the Czech part of the republic reached 
96.8% and in Slovakia 95.4%, which in both cases is almost double the participa-
tion for similar elections in mature democracies. In both republics, parties symbo-
lising political change triumphed.
The elections represented a triumphal victory for the Civic Forum. A total of 127 
OF candidates fought their way into the Czech National Council (49.5% of votes), 
50 candidates to the Chamber of Nations of the Federal Assembly (49.96% votes) 
and 68 OF candidates were elected to Chamber of the People of the Federal As-
sembly (53.15% of votes). This signifi cant victory was explained by sociologist Jan 
Herzmann in terms of several factors:
1) Many voters from both republics were infl uenced by the popularity of Presi-
dent Vaclav Havel, who while not being involved in the campaign offi cially 
was, by virtue of his actions, de facto a supporter of the OF and VPN.
2) The so-called “band-wagon effect” manifested itself in voter decisions: a ten-
dency of the undecided part of the population to support the party that would 
likely win (favoured party).
3) The negative character of the campaign drew more citizens into the political 
battle and compelled them to take part in the elections,
4) The appeal by leaders of the OF to “not vote for small parties” had a no-
ticeable effect on many voters (Herzmann 1992: 165–183; see also Šimíček 
1995: 149).
Table 1: Results of elections to the Federal Assembly, 8–9 June, 1990 













votes % votes %
OF 3,851,172 53.15 68 3,613,513 49.96 50 118
KSČ 979,996 13.48 15 997,919 13.80 12 27
KDU 629,359 8.69 9 633,053 8.75 6 15
HSD-SMS 572,015 7.89 9 658,477 9.10 7 16
Source: cf. Krejčí 2006: 269
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Table 2: Results of elections to the Czech National Council, 8–9 June, 1990 






OF 3,56, 201 49.50 127
KSČ 954,690 13.24 32
HSD-SMS 723,609 10.03 22
KDU 607,134 8.42 19
Source: cf. Krejčí 2006: 270
The fi ve-percent threshold meant that to win its fi rst seat a party required 362,000 
votes in the Czech part of the republic and 169,000 votes in Slovakia. A whole 
series of voters was thus without representation. In numbers this was 1,356,413 
voters in the Czech National Council, 1,215,908 in the Chamber of the People and 
1,328,557 voters in the Chamber of Nations (Krejčí 1994: 191). Voters utilised the 
opportunity to vote for various parties in each of the representative bodies.
In post-election surveys 70% of respondents stated that they had voted for one 
party, 21% for two, and 9% stated that they had voted for three parties (each of the 
Chambers and the Czech National Council were elected separately).
It is interesting to observe the geographical support base of some specifi c parties. 
Traditional Czechoslovak parties in particular were closely comparable to previous 
elections in the 1st and 3rd republics. The Social Democrats had the highest voter 
support in the 1990 election in the Prague area and particularly in northern and 
eastern Bohemia. The social democrats future stronghold – northern Moravia – did 
not have signifi cant interest in the party at these elections.
The KSČ was, traditionally, most popular in northern Bohemia, partially in east-
ern Bohemia, in the areas of central Moravia and in Silesia.
The KDU (and ČSL) confi rmed its strongest positions in southern Moravia and 
newly also in eastern Bohemia.
With newly established parties it is not possible to speak of traditional and non-
traditional areas. The Civic Forum appealed most to residents of Prague, where it 
won 62.47% of votes in the elections to the Federal Assembly House of the People. 
In western Bohemia it also managed to win more than 60% of votes (61.67% to the 
Federal Assembly Chamber of the People).
The HSD-SMS won the most votes (25.2% of votes for the Federal Assembly 
Chamber of the People) in southern Moravia, and was also successful in northern 
Moravia (15.2% Federal Assembly Chamber of the People) (Krejčí 1994: 213–216; 
cf. also: Cigánek 1992: 85–86).
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The elections in June 1990 signifi ed a clear slump in left-wing power. The Com-
munist Party maintained their position as the strongest left-wing formation, how-
ever its election results (13.5% of votes) did not allow it to signifi cantly infl uence 
political events. The social democrats won 4.11% of votes to the Czech National 
Council, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Party fi nished even worse with 2.68% of 
votes. There was an understandable contempt for left-wing politics, stemming from 
efforts to deny the undemocratic nature of the old regime. Paradoxically, the only 
left-wing candidates who won seats in Parliament were those social democrats that 
ran on the OF ticket – these new MPs with Rudolf Battěk at the helm were however 
expelled from ČSSD after the elections.
Basic evaluation of the 1990 elections
With the dominant victory by the OF in the Czech part of the republic, the fi rst 
democratic elections clearly demonstrated the will of citizens to reject the undemo-
cratic foundation of the pre-November regime. Its original leaders, the KSČM, 
were allowed to further function as a legitimate part of the political spectrum. 
These elections can thus be labelled as “retrospective”, since the majority of voters 
cast their vote on the basis of their relationship with the past (Krejčí 1994: 298). 
The success of the People’s Party confi rmed the defi nite relevance of Christian-
democratic elements in Czech politics. A complete surprise in these elections was 
the success of the pro-Moravia movement. The election results demonstrated that 
voters were inclined towards more substantial support of nationally oriented parties 
and smaller parties primarily in elections to National Councils, perhaps because 
they ascribed less importance to them. The elections did by no means decide, and 
could not decide, the specifi c paths social, political and economic changes would 
take in the future.
The fi rst free and democratic elections in June 1990 were also accompanied by 
the absolute instability of the party system. Political parties were essentially only 
just being formed and were fi nding their own topics and voters. They did not have 
their own stable social foundations. Many so-called historical parties (e.g. ČSSD) 
only barely revived their tradition, while others (socialists) did not manage to do 
this at all. Apart from newly originating entities, however, the political scene was 
dominated by two entities, embodying the periods before and immediately after the 
November revolution: the Communist Party and the Civic Forum, a conglomerate 
of various pro-democracy oriented political entities.
After November 1989, the Czech party system did not develop without the infl u-
ence of previous party systems. Its emerging likeness was infl uenced both by ele-
ments of the party-political system of the fi rst Czechoslovak Republic and develop-
ments during the period of the undemocratic regime (Kunc 2000: 166). The greatest 
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infl uence on the likeness of the new party system were of course the historical 
circumstances of the time, i.e. events, the nature of the political environment and 
systemic changes taking place in Czech society immediately after November 1989. 
As Petr Fiala and Maxmilián Strmiska have drawn attention to, transformation of 
a political party is always a complex process, which takes place on two levels. On 
the one hand the likeness of political parties in a system is signifi cantly determined 
by regulation from above – so-called parameters of the fi rst order, which create the 
framework and conditions for the activities of political parties. On the other hand, 
however, a substantial part of the structuring of the internal organisation of political 
parties is driven from below by the members of these parties. Precisely for this rea-
son, some elements of continuity with pre-November development can be preserved 
in the case of political parties (in contrast to other political – e.g. constitutional – 
institutions). In addition, the party system is constantly developing, and this fl ux 
does not diminish – even in stabilised democratic systems the development of party 
systems can be very tumultuous (e.g. Italy and France). The most important factors 
for the development of the party system are precisely those social phenomena that 
have the most diffi culty maintaining their permanence, and which have a tendency 
towards constant movement – the social stratifi cation of a society, the social-moral 
environment, relevant cleavages and so on (Fiala – Strmiska 2001).
The determining factor in the creation of a party spectrum in the immediate post-
communist period was the absence of classic (Rokkan) historical cleavages in the 
disoriented Czech society. These cleavages only grew in signifi cance very slowly 
and gradually, as the fi rst results of the social and economic reforms expressed 
themselves in the fi rst years of transformation. This understandably affected the 
likeness of Czech political parties and movements in the fi rst phase of transforma-
tion, at least in that these entities were only just gradually forming their ideological 
foundations and fi nding fi rmer grounding among individual groups of voters.
While in this period there is an opening of space for the foundation and func-
tion of political parties, nevertheless some basic systematic insuffi ciencies, which 
have their origins in the deep political change which the entire society underwent, 
express themselves here. Tens of political parties and other entities were estab-
lished before the elections in June 1990; however these parties did not have a fi rm 
anchoring in the electoral structure and did not manage to assert themselves as 
generally accepted instruments of the political competition. The fi rst period of the 
creation of the Czech party system is thus characterised by a constant precipitancy 
(creation and regrouping of political entities took place almost continuously right 
until the fi rst free elections), ambiguity of the positions of individual players (not 
just party entities) within the system and a lack of grounded models of behaviour 
among players of the political game. As S. Mainwaring points out, it is precisely 
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institutionalisation and the anchoring of the party system that are the key factors 
for nascent developing democracies (Mainwaring 1998: 71). Miroslav Novák, for 
example, for this reason infers that a critical analysis, on the basis of established 
methods, of the party system can in the Czech case only be seriously used only 
for development after the parliamentary elections in 1992 (Novák – Lebeda et al. 
2004: 254).
Political power in the fi rst period, that is until the elections in June 1990, was to 
a signifi cant extent distributed by other means, particularly on the basis of personal 
relationships between members of the new political elite, and political parties were 
not yet perceived as representatives and mediators of the interests of individual 
social groups, as even the social stratifi cation of Czech society was undergoing 
a tumultuous process of transformation.
The rapid and spontaneous process of the creation of the fi rst political entities 
which, thanks to its striking dynamics, made a speedy stabilisation of models of 
functioning of the competition between Czech political parties impossible also cor-
responded to this. This in fact allowed the Civic Forum to maintain itself in the 
position of dominant player in political events at least until the 1990 elections. The 
public perceived political parties with a certain contempt, as a consequence of the 
many years of the assertion of the power monopoly of the KSČ. The new political 
elite, represented in this phase chiefl y by dissidents from the OF, also had a reserved 
approach to political partisanship, and preferred the utilisation of mutual bonds and 
communicational means used during the period of dissent. The new elite also ex-
pressed an equally ambivalent relationship to the classic mechanisms of representa-
tion and mediation of political interests in general.3 Political scientist Pavel Pšeja 
projects this (formerly dissident) defence of the idea of non-partisanship, even in 
the sense of the preference of the principle of civic society to classic structures of 
political parties, not only into political discussions, but also into political science 
approaches to the study of political parties, and demonstrates how this phenomenon 
co-created the positions of several of the leading Czech political scientists, such 
as Jiří Kunc and Michal Klíma (Pšeja 2005: 12). In this fi rst period, even giving 
precedence to the above-mentioned elements of “revolutionary direct democracy” 
did not benefi t political parties.
3 Václav Havel, for example, moderated his originally negative view of political partys somewhat 
with the passage of time, as can be seen, for example in an interview with Respekt magazine, 
where he defended political parties as the political space in which ideas and political leaders are 
born – cf.: Respekt 1998 (15): 10.
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Cleavages in the fi rst phase of the creation of the Czech party system 
(up to the 1990 elections)
Defi ning the main Rokkan cleavages (Lipset – Rokkan eds. 1967) for the ini-
tial period of transition of Czech society to democracy is very complex, as it is 
necessary to realise that the whole of Czech society was undergoing a period of 
fundamental political change, which above all represented the blurring of interests 
and position of individual social strata. Some political scientists, such as Ladislav 
Mrklas, point specifi cally to the signifi cant destruction of the social structure of 
Czech society during the communist regime, which made it almost impossible to 
apply Cleavage theory to the analysis of the fi rst transition period (Mrklas 2003: 
249). On the other hand, other authors such as Miroslav Novák do not entirely agree 
that the impact of the communist regime upon the social structure of the Czech 
society was so destructive that the cleavages, similar to Western society, could not 
be quickly restored (Novák 1999: 135–136). Novák thus actually builds partly 
on the theory of Raymond Aron (Aron 1993) arguing that the communist regime 
was a form of industrial society, in which – similarly to the world of democracy 
and market economy - similar social processes exist (urbanisation, secularisation, 
and consumerism); with the exception that in communist regimes the real social 
interests of citizens were suppressed. Nevertheless, the real existence of diverse 
social interests, and therefore also the social stratifi cation of society in Communist 
regimes, provides M. Novák arguments for the conclusion that in Czechoslovakia 
after November 1989, for example, there were suitable conditions for the classical 
cleavages of Western European societies to resume relatively quickly (Novák – 
Lebeda et al. 2004: 258).
The possibility of applying cleavage theory to the countries of Central and East-
ern Europe in the fi rst period of post-communist transition was quite categorically 
refuted by M. G. Roskin, according to whom the process of transition to democracy 
in the region took place so quickly that during it there was no time for deep ties 
between political parties and voter groups to be created (Roskin 1994).
Despite the diffi culties mentioned above, however, let us try to ascertain whether 
during the fi rst period of the structuring of the Czech party system after 1989 we 
can fi nd at least some indications of traditional cleavages. The fundamental and fi rst 
cleavage, which accompanied the post-November transformation of Czech society, 
can perhaps be identifi ed as the cleavage of KSČ – its opposition, or the cleavage 
of the old regime – new regime. In the fi rst phase (up to the elections in June 1990), 
however, it is not possible to observe any other signifi cant issues beyond this basic 
division that could polarize society in the period of the nascent party system (Fiala 
– Herbut 2003: 16). The striking electoral success of the OF in fact also led to the 
ending of the relevance of this division.
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The results of the June elections also indicated the defi nite, albeit signifi cantly 
weaker, relevance of cleavages in the sense of their fundamental defi nition by Stein 
Rokkan:
1) The cleavage of church – state, which expressed itself in the relative success 
of the Christian-democratic formation KDU.
2) The cleavage of centre – periphery, which found its expression in the surpris-
ing success of the pro-Moravian HSD-SMS. Perhaps the main reason for the 
massive voter support of this entity was, in the framework of a democratis-
ing society, the open-ended question of the strengthening of the role of the 
Moravia-Silesia region in the framework of constitutional organisation. This 
cleavage also expressed itself in the constitutional disputes among repre-
sentatives of the Czech and Slovak political elite in 1990–1992.
3) The cleavage of urban – rural, which expressed itself in different voter posi-
tions between urban and rural populations (e.g. the relative success of the 
Communist Party in rural areas).
Jiří Kunc also noted that while the infl uence of classic historical cleavages was 
only marginal during the fi rst period of post-communist transformation of Czech 
society, in the subsequent period the classic characteristics of these social cleav-
ages developed signifi cantly (Kunc 2000: 167). After the achievement of the basic 
objectives of a broad democratic movement (i.e. removing the old regime) there is 
a differentiation of this broad movement, particularly on the basis of the restoration 
of socio-economic cleavages. These, in the form of cleavages founded on the rela-
tionship of citizens to the radically changing structure of property ownership within 
the society (which can be interpreted as the embodiment of the classic division into 
right and left4) had in 1990 not yet expressed itself markedly, though in later years 
(especially in 1991–1992 and later up to 1996) clearly became the most important 
cleavage in Czech society.
The low level of relevance of this cleavage in the fi rst year of transformation 
related to the fact that in Czech society, undergoing a radically discontinuous de-
velopment after November 1989, no fi rmly anchored positions existed that were 
measurable in terms of opinion polls, nor any clearly interest-based social strata 
within society. In the following years (from 1992 onwards) it is possible to observe 
a further strengthening of socio-economic cleavages, expressed by the growing 
signifi cance of the class dimension of electoral voting. This cleavage is refl ected in 
4 Herbert Kitschelt however offers another comparison when pointing out that the cleavage of 
transformation is comparable to the cleavage of pro-market liberals – anti-market authoritarians – 
cf.: Kitschelt 1992: 7–51. Brno political scientist Pavel Pšeja discusses in this regard the cleavage 
of social – liberal cf.: Pšeja 2005: 18.
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the sharp division of Czech society into supporters of the left and right, and in the 
fi rst years of the existence of an independent Czech Republic was a positive sign 
that events were gradually leading to the projection of the interests and values of 
voters – members of individual social strata – upon their voting preferences. This 
development confi rms István Szelényi’s conclusion that in the transition countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe the concepts of left and right are assuming their full 
meaning depending on the institutionalisation of party systems, which refl ects the 
victory of “politics of interests” over “politics of symbols” (Szelényi – Szelényi 
– Poster 1996: 466–477). This then results in the strengthening of the relationship 
between social class and choice of political parties
In the Czech Republic, this process gradually led to the strengthening of the 
camp of left-wing voters in particular (and was involved in the gradual growth of 
support for ČSSD from 1993), especially since this camp was in the immediately 
post-revolution period politically fragmented and considerably weakened (Mrklas 
2003: 249). Sociological surveys in 1990 found high levels of discordance between 
voting preference and the value orientation of voters (Novák – Lebeda et al. 2004: 
261). This was due primarily to a very one-sided bias of Czech society towards the 
right (opposition to the left, associated with the old regime, pro-market euphoria, 
rediscovering the values of Euro-Atlantic civilisation, etc.), which only started to 
balance during the subsequent several years.
The following common features apply to Czech society in the post-communist 
period, as they do to all other transitional societies of Central and Eastern Europe:
A) In the fi rst phases of transformation the individual national societies are not 
strongly socially stratifi ed;
B) Individual groups of people (social classes) are inconsistent in opinion, fl uid 
in their interests and unstable in their political preferences;
C) More signifi cantly formed cleavages are not a refl ection of the natural social 
stratifi cation of society but rather of an artifi cial ideological and political con-
fl ict provoked by political parties within the ongoing electoral competition, 
and only later artifi cially introduced among voters (Hloušek 2000: 373–395).
The basic characteristics of the fi rst political movements also corresponded to the 
basic signs that accompanied social transformation in Central and Eastern Europe 
after 1989:
1) Transitions from communism to democracy were initially carried out by very 
broad and unstructured social movements, which always appealed to the non-
communist majority;
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2) Supporters of these movements were people from all professions and life-
styles, with a number of different political views and opinions. This meant 
that these movements did not speak on behalf of specifi c groups within soci-
ety, but rather in the name of “everyone”;
3) These “social movements” were coalitions of a large number of small groups, 
be they potential political parties or small interest groups. The OF included 
14 different entities, including the Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, 
neo-liberals, reform communists, former dissidents and ecologists. The 
Bulgarian Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) was composed of 17 separate 
groups, which included both political parties and interest groups (including 
the revived social democracy), Ekoglasnosť environmental groups and the 
Green Party. The Slovenian Democratic Union (DEMOS) was composed of 
7 different parties, including the Christian Democrats, Liberals, Agrarians 
and Greens. Poland’s Solidarity was composed of blue-collar and agricul-
tural groups, trade unionists, intellectuals, the Christian Democrats and other 
political streams. Other organized movements such as the Hungarian Demo-
cratic Forum, Slovakia’s Public against Violence and the Romanian National 
Salvation Front were organised similarly.
1) With the possible exception of Solidarity, these new movements did not focus 
their activities upon acquiring and retaining power, but rather on obtaining 
adequate representation which would be able to face the communists;
2) In reality these new movements can be understood more as organised col-
lective campaigns against the previous regime. This is because they united 
citizens against the former communist regime rather than for a certain model 
of society.
Compared with classic political parties these social movements had the following 
characteristics:
a) Very vague, unspecifi ed ideologies (the programmes of these movements in 
1989 encompassed, in particular, the requirement for the restoration of plu-
ralist democracy and the market economy. The programmes also had a very 
strong moralistic nature;
b) Broad electoral support and an extensive spectrum of viewpoints on the solu-
tion to basic social problems;
c) Universal appeal in an effort to prevent attempt to create religious and politi-
cal divisions (e.g. left-right spectrum);
d) Vague organisational structure;
e) More characteristics of pressure groups rather than political parties;
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f) The tendency to mobilise the public on the basis of a simple topic (in the case 
of the fi rst “founding” elections this was an effort to prevent the Communists 
retaining power);
g) Their objective was simply representation, not power;
h) Newly elected Members of these movements lacked interest in the organisa-
tional aspects of the party, and in Parliament had very weak party discipline;
i) These political groups specifi cally abstained from using the word “party” 
to escape from the context (connotation) of the past, and called themselves 
a “front”, “forum”, “Union”, “Movement”, “Association”, etc.;
j) Often designated themselves as a “social movement”
These specifi c characteristics of the democratising movements emerging in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe in 1989 later also infl uenced the likeness of the newly 
forming party systems in these countries. These were from the start of their incep-
tion accompanied by certain specifi c features, such as the lack of mass parties, the 
prevalence of cadre parties, the personalisation of politics, an effort by the largest 
political parties to present themselves as “catch-all parties” and appealing to all 
voter groups in an effort to rid them of a general and common enemy. For this 
reason such parties are very similar to cadre parties, based strongly on ideology or 
membership of the social-political elite.
As demonstrated by sociological analyses of political orientation and electoral 
preference of Czech society after 1989, these results concretely manifest them-
selves in the Czech political system in that Czech politics is dominated by two main 
axes: the left-right axis, which is supplemented by the authoritarianism-liberalism 
axis (Večerník – Matějů 1998: 218). Unlike the mature societies of Western Europe 
however, in Czech society the level of signifi cance of left-right perception of poli-
tics is much higher, and the role of the second axis is substantially weaker.
This is also refl ected in the political self-identifi cation of members of social 
groups in Czech society. While individuals who rank themselves at the top of the 
social hierarchy are more likely to vote for the right and have strongly liberal at-
titudes, members of social groups of lower standing are more likely to sympathise 
with the left and have a greater tendency to authoritarian attitudes. Members of the 
slowly emerging middle class are then generally classed as moderate right voters 
with a slight inclination towards liberalism (Večerník – Matějů 1998: 219).
The results of opinion polls relating to the attitudes of the Czech middle class 
become interesting when we include such status symbols as education or profession 
in the values observed. While members of the so-called old middle class (people 
characterised solely by having completed tertiary education, under the old regime) 
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exhibit more of an inclination to support the moderate liberal right, members of the 
so-called new middle class (created after November 1989 and characterised mainly 
by their profession as traders or entrepreneurs) often show an inclination for more 
radical political attitudes.
Also interesting in the observation of electoral behaviour of Czech voters is the 
fact that according to the above-mentioned sociological analysis, membership of 
the middle class is considered a more substantial factor than level of education 
attained (Večerník – Matějů 1998: 222). For these members of the middle class, 
whose subjective self-identifi cation with this class corresponds also to their objec-
tive classifi cation, a more substantial clarity of political attitudes can be observed. 
These typical representatives of the middle class have deeper-rooted anti-egali-
tarian attitudes, more clearly defi ned attitudes against the ideas of socialism and 
strong support of the principles of fair play in society, including an emphasis on the 
principle of equal opportunity (Večerník – Matějů 1998: 223).
If we try to summarise the characteristics of the fi rst democratic elections in 
Czechoslovakia since 1946, it is possible to observe that the elections took place 
according to clearly defi ned democratic rules and allowed voters a real pluralistic 
choice of candidate entities, by which they fulfi lled their main and most important 
role – the foundation of a new democratic regime and the provision of democratic 
legitimacy to the elected representatives of the public.
Public against Violence
The Public against Violence (VPN – Verejnosť proti násiliu) was established as 
a broad movement on 20th November 1989 and entered the election in the position of 
a party that had participated in the discussions about the transition to democracy in 
November and December 1989, and subsequently in the composition of a “govern-
ment of national understanding”. In the party system it did not have as dominant 
a position as the Civic Forum had in the Czech part of the republic. This was also 
evident in the election result. Although the VPN won, their victory was not as clear-
cut as the OF’s victory in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The KDH represented 
signifi cant competition, and managed to attract part of the opposition-minded vote 
because of its connections to Christian dissent from the period of normalisation, and 
also utilised the high level of religiosity of Slovak society (Kopeček 2007: 304–305).
The VPN’s position in the party system was also complicated by an illegible 
ideological orientation, a problem that was faced by all similar entities in post-
communist Europe. As in the case of the OF in the Czech Republic, Solidarity in 
Poland and the Sajudis movement in Lithuania, the Slovak VPN movement was 
ideologically very pluralistic and embodied diverse currents of opinion, whose link 
was an opposition to the communists. According to Vladimír Leška, the VPN was 
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“organisationally and ideologically ambivalent and amorphous” (Leška 2006: 24), 
while Ladislav Cabada, again in relation to the VPN, speaks of a “conglomerate 
uniting a wide range of personalities” (Cabada 2000: 85) Slovak political scientists 
Ján Liďák, Viera Koganová and Dušan Leška identifi ed six key groups within the 
VPN (Liďák – Koganová – Leška 1999: 23):
1. Reform communists from the period of the Prague Spring, who were later 
persecuted during normalisation and who joined together to form the Resur-
gence club (e.g. Alexander Dubček, Hvězdon Kočtúch and Augustín Marián 
Húska);
2. Christian dissenters (e.g. brothers Jan and Ivan Čarnogurský and Jozef and 
František Mikloško);5
3. Representatives of the Green and Environmental movements (e.g. Ján Budaj 
and Peter Tatár);
4. Civil dissenters, so-called “islands of positive deviation” (e.g. Jozef Kučerák, 
Ivan Mikloš, Vladimír Ondruš and Peter Zajac);6
5. Pragmatics and ‘uncompromised’ communists (e.g. Milan Čič and Marián 
Čalfa);7
6. Artists (e.g. Milan Kňažko and Ladislav Chudík) (Liďák – Koganová – Leška 
1999: 23)
The above characteristics of the VPN correspond to the defi nition of an entity that 
was not a classic political party. The terms “parties of the movement type” (Ágh 
1998: 203) “parties of the forum type” (lster – Offe – Preuss 1998: 132) and “um-
brella organisations” (Gill 2002: 37) became common for labelling these entities, 
emerging in essentially all of post-communist Europe. These were characterised 
by a loose organisational structure, lower level of hierarchism, broader ideological 
boundaries and a related lower level of discipline among the member base. In the 
VPN the main link of the individual streams of thought was the notion of the rejec-
tion of communism, which held the entire entity relatively together at this time, 
however the fi rst cracks began to appear shortly after the election.
5 Representatives of the Christian wing of the VPN sooner or later ended up in the ranks of the 
KDH.
6 The representatives of civic dissent on the other hand generally ended up in the DS, later the OKS.
7 Membership of the VPN and candidacy for the movement in the 1990 election was also offered 
to the post-revolution chairman of the Slovak National Council (KSS). He, however, refused it 
with the words that he “would only be an instrument for the gaining of votes for VPN”. Schuster 
himself claims that while he would probably have been elected to parliament, “that is where my 
political career would have ended; the post-election parliament and governmental positions had 
already been allocated beforehand, and not to former members of the KSČ,without regard to their 
expertise and experience or moral profi le and attitudes in the past“ See: Leško 2000: 28; Schuster 
1997: 332.
Politics in Central Europe.indd   61 8.7.10   11:26
62




The Christian-democratic Movement (KDH – Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie), 
originating in February 1990, continued the tradition of Christian dissent from the 
period of normalisation (Kopeček 2007: 304–305). Christian dissent was, general-
ly, much more active and signifi cant in Slovakia than civil dissent, which generally 
also refl ects the infl uence of the church upon political and social events in Slovakia, 
in comparison with the Czech part of the then common state. Christian democrats 
also drew upon the “massive post-revolution authority of the Catholic Church and 
from the initial popularity of its leader (Ján Čarnogurský, author’s comment)” 
(Kopeček 2000; Kopeček 2007: 304–305). Despite the fact that within the confl ict 
over the likeness of the political regime the VPN and KDH stood on the same side 
of the fence, in the second confl ict of church – state they de facto stood on opposite 
sides of the confl ict (Rybář 2003: 278–279). Although the church – state cleavage 
played a certain role, it was not dominant enough during the period to prevent the 
emergence of a coalition alliance between the VPN and KDH.
Democratic Party
After November 1989, the Democratic Party (DS – Demokratická strana) fol-
lowed in the tradition of its predecessor of 1944–1948. From 1948 to 1989 it ex-
isted under the name of the Slovak Resurgence Party (SSO – Strana slovenskej 
obrody). In December 1989 it returned to the DS name and began distancing itself 
from its National-front past. This change was completed in January 1990, when 
pre-February party functionary Martin Kvetko, returning from exile, became leader 
of the party. The party ran alone in the fi rst free elections.
Hungarian political parties
The renewal of a pluralist party system was also refl ected in the political re-activa-
tion of ethnic minorities. Considering the presence of a sizeable Hungarian minority 
in Slovakia, it was not surprising that this particularly involved parties representing 
this community. Immediately after November 1989, several entities representing 
ethnic minorities emerged. Immediately, on the 18th November 1989, the Hungarian 
Independent Initiative (MNI – Maďarská nezávislá iniciatíva), a liberally oriented 
movement of mainly Hungarian intellectuals, was established. In the fi rst elections 
the MNI went into the elections in a pre-election coalition with the VPN, thanks to 
which it gained a share of power after the elections. In 1992, the MNI transformed 
into the Hungarian Civic Party (MOS – Maďarská občianska strana).
The Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH – Maďarské 
kresťanskodemokratické hnutie), formed on 17th March 1990, capitalised on the 
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religious character of Slovak society. It co-operated with the Coexistence movement 
(EGY – Együttélés-Spolužitie-Wspólnota-Soužití), which was founded by former dis-
sident Miklós Duray on 1st March 1990, and which originally intended to represent 
various ethnic minorities living in Slovakia. Considering the marginal representation 
of other ethnic minorities, however, it in reality functioned as a Hungarian entity, in 
addition to which its rhetoric was highly radical, and together with its representatives it 
is most commonly associated with allegations of activities leading to the secession of 
territories in southern Slovakia and their integration into Hungary. MKDH and EGY 
went to the elections in coalition in 1990, were successful, but remained in opposition.
Hungarian parties did not primarily focus on defi ning their position on the left-right 
scale; the key identifi er of their activities and programme was the representation of 
minority interests. This party can be classifi ed in terms of the Centre – Periphery 
cleavage line. It is interesting that the Hungarian parties did not support the emancipa-
tory tendencies of Slovakia and preferred the preservation of the Czechoslovak state.
Slovak National Party
The Slovak National Party (SNS – Slovenská národná strana), like the DS, built 
on the history of its predecessor. In the case of SNS this was an entity that existed 
from 1871 to 1938 (after this it was merged with the HSĽS (Hlinka’s Slovak Peo-
ple’s Party, Hlinkova Slovenská Ľudová strana), and after the war its restoration 
was not authorised). The revival of the party hence did not take place until 7th 
March 1990. The profi le of the party refl ected, to a certain extent, the activation 
of ethnic minority parties and also the effort to underpin the “growing demand for 
a solution to the national agenda” (Kopeček 2007: 418) in relation to the standing 
of Slovakia within Czechoslovakia. In time the SNS became the main supporter of 
the division of the united state.
Communist Party of Slovakia
The Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS – Komunistická strana Slovenska) en-
tered the fi rst elections to the Slovak National Council as a part of the KSČ, the 
former state-wide party which was, as a result of the November events, removed 
from monopoly power. In the period from 1989 to 1990 it and the VPN together 
participated in the Slovak government of national understanding. Though it was 
still a part of the state-wide KSČ (in fact its territorial organization), it was evident 
that its internal processes and changes were directed elsewhere than the offi cial 
national politics of the Communists. In February 1990 a group with Peter Weiss 
and Milan Ftáčník at its centre took over the leadership of KSS and began a social-
democratic transformation. While they fi nished the elections in 4th place, the share 
of votes won was similar to Communists in the Czech part of the republic.
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Elections, called by a resolution of the presidium of the Slovak National Council8 
for 8–9 June 1990, were intended to be a signifi cant milestone in the process of 
democratising society that had been started in November 1989. In these fi rst “post-
November” elections on Slovak territory a total of 16 entities stood for election and 
seven won seats in the Slovak National Council. A total of 95.4% of Slovaks exer-
cised their right to vote in June 1990 (Novotný 2000). Thanks to the low threshold for 
entry of a party into parliament, only 7.6% of votes in the election were ineffectual. 
Taking into account the high voter turnout, low number of ineffectual votes and the 
use of Hare quotas, it can be concluded that the result of the election was likely the 
most faithful to date, and refl ected the political preferences of the Slovak population.
Table 3: Results of elections to the Federal Assembly, 8–9 June, 1990 









Votes won Seats Votes won Seats FA MPsvotes % votes %
VPN 1 104 125 32.54 19 1 262 278 37.28 33 52
KDH 644 008 18.98 11 564 172 16.66 14 25
KSČ 468 411 13.81 8 454 740 13.43 12 20
SNS 372 025 10.96 6 387 387 11.44 9 15
MKDH-EGY 291 287 8.58 5 287 426 8.49 7 12
Source: cf. Krejčí 2006: 270
Table 4: Results of elections to the Slovak National Council, 8–9 June, 1990 
(only entities that won seats)
Party, movement, 
coalition
Votes won Seatsvotes %
VPN-MNI 991 285 29.35 48
KDH 648 782 19.21 31
SNS 470 984 13.94 22
KSČ 450 855 13.35 22
MKDH-EGY 292 636 8.66 14
DS 148 567 4.40 7
SZ 117 871 3.49 6
Source: Štatistický úrad SR (Slovak Statistical Offi ce) (http://www.statistics.sk)
8 Uznesenie P SNR 16. 3. 1990 (Resolution of the Presidium of the Slovak National Council of 13th 
March, 1990).
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The VPN dominated, particularly in large cities. It achieved the best result in 
Košice (43.71%) and in Bratislava region number 1 (42.23%), and its weakest re-
sults were in areas with a strong Hungarian minority, where citizens voted along 
ethnic lines. The VPN fared worst in the Komárno region (13%).9
The KDH gained a signifi cantly higher than average share of votes in the Dolný 
Kubín (44.19%) and in Stará Ľubovňa (39.53%) districts, faring worst in the Duna-
jská Streda (1.35%) and Komárno (1.89%) districts, which are home to a consider-
able Hungarian minority.10
SNS strongholds in the 1990 elections were the Považská Bystrica (31.18%) and 
Žilina (30.20%) districts. Like other Slovak parties it fared badly particularly in 
Dunajská Streda (1.11%) and Komárno (1.52%).11
The communists had the best results in the districts of Rožňava (24.69%) and 
Svidník (22.86%). Apart from Dunajská Streda (7.26%) their worst result was in 
the Dolný Kubín district (7.15%).12
The coalition of two Hungarian parties naturally crushed its rivals in Dunajská 
Streda (68.40%) and Komárno (64.69%) It had weak results in several places, par-
ticularly the Čadca district (0.03%).13
The DS had above-average success in the Martin district (10.22%) and did 
worse in, again, Dunajská Streda (0.6%). The Greens succeeded mainly in Košice 
(5.96%) and Senica (5.09%), faring badly in Dunajská Streda (1.53%) and Komár-
no (1.86%).14
The subsequent post-election coalition bargaining was foreshadowed by several 
factors which signifi cantly infl uenced its course and the role of different entities 
in the party system. Perhaps the most important factor was the almost automatic 
exclusion of the KSČ, or KSS, from any consideration of participation in govern-
ment. Given the atmosphere in society and the socio-political context of the 1990 
elections it was practically unrealistic to form a government with the participation 
of the Communist Party. The main confl ict of these elections was a confl ict over 
the form of the regime, which was generally perceived as a confl ict between the 
Communist Party on the one hand and newcomers of the type of the VPN or KDH, 
on the other (Rybář 2003: 278).
Coalition negotiations eventually resulted in the creation of an unnecessary ma-
jority coalition, which included the DS, as well as the VPN-MNI and KDH, which 
9 Štatistický úrad SR (Slovak Statistical Offi ce) (http://www.statistics.sk).
10 Štatistický úrad SR (Slovak Statistical Offi ce) (http://www.statistics.sk).
11 Štatistický úrad SR (Slovak Statistical Offi ce) (http://www.statistics.sk).
12 Štatistický úrad SR (Slovak Statistical Offi ce) (http://www.statistics.sk).
13 Štatistický úrad SR (Slovak Statistical Offi ce) (http://www.statistics.sk).
14 Štatistický úrad SR (Slovak Statistical Offi ce) (http://www.statistics.sk).
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in themselves held an absolute majority of seats in Parliament. In the 150 seat Slo-
vak parliament the coalition held 86 seats. The reason for this unnecessary enlarge-
ment of the coalition with the addition of DS could however have been a purely 
symbolic response to the signifi cance of this party in post-war Slovak history. 
The fate of DS after February 1948 was, more than any other even in Slovakia, 
associated with the communist rise to power, and perhaps this is one of the reasons 
why the revived DS was invited to the fi rst coalition government established after 
the free elections in June 1990. At the head of the government stood the leader of 
the VPN in the election, Vladimír Mečiar. There was a series of reasons why the 
VPN chose Mečiar for the post of prime minister. The reason relevant to the topic 
of coalition government relates to the utilisation of the charismatic and penetrat-
ing Mečiar to “highlight the VPN in competition with its government partner, the 
KDH” (Kopeček 2007: 130). The VPN did not after all have as dominant a posi-
tion in Slovakia as, for example, the OF did in the Czech part of the federation, 
which was confi rmed by the results of the elections. The KDH was a very serious 
competitor to the VPN. The leader of the KDH, Ján Čarnogurský, became the fi rst 
deputy prime minister of the Slovak government. The coalition also divided all 
posts at the highest levels of the Slovak National Council: the chairman (VPN) 
and fi ve vice-chairmen (2 x KDH, VPN, DS, and MNI). Only four places in the 
wider presidium (of 21) and the chairmanship of one of a total of 11 parliamentary 
committees remained for the opposition.15
The debate over the programme statement took two days, and apart from the 
chairman and members of the government 47 MPs made presentations. On 4th July 
1990, 93 legislators voted in favour of the programme announcement, even though 
the coalition government itself only had 86 seats. Because detailed documentation 
about how individual MPs voted is not yet available for this period, it is only pos-
sible to guess about which of the opposition MPs supported the government. Most 
frequently mentioned in this context is support from the SZ (the Green Party) and 
from Hungarian MPs. On the other hand the possibility that the government was 
15 The entire discussion about the fi lling of positions in the newly elected Slovak National Council at 
the fi rst meeting on 16th July 1990 ware relatively stormy. The opposition, formed by the commu-
nists and nationalists as well as two Hungarian entities and the Greens claimed that it was cut off 
from positions in the SNR. The subsequent conversation was about the clash of two conceptions 
of fi lling positions: proportionately, which the opposition supported, and coalitional, which was 
supported by the newly formed coalition government majority. In the fi nal vote the coalition’s 
principals won out. The overall structure of the presidium of the Slovak National Council was: 
Coalition (17) – VPN-MNI – 9, KDH – 6, DS – 2; Opposition (4): SZ – 1, SNS – 1, Hungar-
ian parties – 1, KSČ-KSS – 1. See: minutes and resolution from the meeting available in The 
Joint Cczech and Slovak Digital Parliamentary Library (In: http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1990snr/
stenprot/001schuz/s001001.htm).
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supported by legislators from the KSČ or SNS can be practically excluded. Eight 
legislators voted against and 31 abstained.16
Shortly after being established, the government formed after the June elections in 
1990 had to face its fi rst serious crisis, which threatened the cohesion of the coali-
tion government. This was the dispute between Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar 
and KDH Minister of the Interior Anton Andráš, where the confl ict was more on 
the level of power and politics rather than material, relating to Mečiar’s function 
as interior minister in the government before the elections in 1990. “Mečiar did 
not want to release his ministry of the interior, and the information to which it had 
given him access before the election, out of his control, and he did not miss a single 
opportunity to criticise Minister Andráš” (Kopeček 2007: 131). A large question 
mark still hangs over the role of Vladimír Mečiar as minister of the interior in the 
fi rst half of 1990. On the one hand he was considered to be a capable and penetrat-
ing politician; on the other hand he remains accused of misusing information to 
which he had access as minister, including, for example, the fi les of the former StB, 
to pressure his political antagonists. He faced the specifi c accusation that in January 
1990, on his orders, materials of the former StB, which contained fi les about certain 
future, post-November politicians, were stolen from the StB building in Trenčín. 
Mečiar’s defence was that he “supposedly one day found these documents on the 
table in his offi ce” (Žitný 1994: 34; for more see Lesná 2001). This is why the 
ministry of the interior was so close to his heart, and why by controlling its activi-
ties he wanted to also protect himself. The prime minister accused Minister Andráš 
of incompetence and called for his resignation. Mečiar brought the confl ict onto 
coalition ground, and under the threat of “either Andráš resigns or I do” (Kopeček 
2007: 131) compelled Andráš to resign.
Another crisis affecting the coalition as a whole came in connection with a devel-
opment within the strongest government party, the VPN. After assuming govern-
mental responsibilities, it became more and more clear that the VPN programme 
and the spectrum of opinions of its representatives (including ministers and MPs) 
was so broad and encompassing of various approaches to transformation, the future 
of the federation and to socio-economic issues that the movement could only barely 
ostensibly remain a unifi ed entity. The programme and ideological breadth made an 
unambiguous identifi cation of the VPN and its classifi cation among classic party 
groups impossible (Kopeček 2007: 140). The “organisational and ideological 
ambivalence and amorphousness” of the VPN thus began to fully show (Leška 
2006: 24). On one side stood a group of more right-wing oriented politicians, pro-
moting “shock therapy”, more radical forms of economic reform similar to those 
16 See stenographic minutes of the meeting of the Slovak National Council of 4th July 1990 (In: 
http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1990snr/stenprot/002schuz/s002019.htm).
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being initiated and implemented on the federal level by fi nance minister Václav 
Klaus – price liberalisation, voucher privatisation, restrictive economic politics and 
opening up to foreign capital. This group found support from another two coali-
tion partners, as both the KDH and DS identifi ed themselves as right-wing parties 
and mostly supported Klaus’ reforms, even if their leaders did not agree with the 
rapid pace with which they were implemented. In contrast, the left-wing movement 
within the VPN was trying to promote a so-called gradualist approach - opposed to 
rapid change, highlighting the need for the social acceptability of reforms and their 
gradual application (Liďák – Koganová – Leška 1999: 31). From an overall view 
of the coalition it can be said that in the government this left-wing movement of the 
VPN was in the minority.
The dispute within the VPN, however, also had another dimension. Apart from 
the above-mentioned plurality of opinion within the movement, the political and 
power ambitions of certain VPN leaders and the rivalry between Chairman Fedor 
Gál and the Slovak Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar played a very signifi cant role 
in the dissolution of the coalition. Peter Učeň identifi es two groups within this 
confl ict: bearers of a vision and power pragmatists (Učeň 1999: 86). He associates 
the fi rst with the function of the offi cial party leadership, with Fedor Gál at its 
helm, and identifi es them as liberal democrats; the power pragmatics are described 
as the people around Vladimír Mečiar, who found government appointments after 
the elections. The power-seeking pragmatics “more and more inclined towards an 
aggressive and non-consensus political style, the use of illegal means of pressure 
(extortion, manipulation of StB fi les and disinformation for the purposes of infl u-
encing public opinion)” (Učeň 1999: 87).
The contrasts between the two groups also predominated in the question of posi-
tion on future constitutional organisation. This topic generally found its way into 
the forefront of the political agenda and the second coalition party, the KDH, also 
played a part in this (Kopeček 2007: 307). The views of parts of the VPN on issues 
of constitutional organisation and the position of Slovakia however introduced na-
tional populism into the debate, and the power pragmatics utilised this in their ap-
pearances by inciting the desire for a higher level of autonomy for Slovakia within 
the Czechoslovak federation. While the group around Gál was more aligned with 
Czechoslovakia, Mečiar and his supporters increasingly and to varying degrees 
openly oriented themselves towards a sovereign Slovakia (Cabada 2000: 85).
The atmosphere within the VPN (and thanks to the position of the VPN as the 
strongest government party also within the coalition) was hence very tense. Events 
in the VPN and dealing with intra-party problems to a certain extent paralysed the 
coalition government. This was because Mečiar continued in his efforts to strength-
en his infl uence in the VPN and there were increasingly frequent attacks on Fedor 
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Gál, for which Mečiar often even used Gál’s Jewish background, and so the attacks 
were often of an anti-Semitic character. The rivalry between Gál’s and Mečiar’s 
factions of the VPN subsequently outgrew the VPN in a series of reciprocal public 
attacks, accusations and the like. The revelation of the above-mentioned suspicions 
that Mečiar had as Slovak minister of the interior in the government of national 
understanding of Milan Čič from 1989 to 1990 illegally gained and accumulated 
materials from the former communist secret police and misused them to intimidate 
and extort certain members of the government and his opponents also played a role 
(Lesná 2001: 35).17 An accusation also surfaced against Mečiar that he had secretly 
dealt with Soviet generals in the sale of arms (Stein 2000: 83). The divisions peaked 
in March 1991 with the accusation on the part of Mečiar’s supporters that the lead-
ership of the VPN was censoring his speeches. Mečiar and his supporters founded 
the Platform for a Democratic Slovakia (ZDS) within the VPN, with which he later 
left the VPN and founded the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS – Hnu-
tie za demokratické Slovensko).
This division within the strongest governing party understandably weakened the 
coalition as a whole. In April 1991, the presidium of the Slovak National Council 
removed Vladimír Mečiar from the offi ce of Prime Minister of Slovakia on the 
suggestion of the chairman of the Slovak Council of the VPN, Fedor Gál (which 
it had the right to do under then Constitution and applicable legal provisions; see 
Constitutional law No.143/1968: article 122, paragraph 1, section a), and a similar 
fate struck several other ministers close to Vladimír Mečiar. Several others ten-
dered their resignation. The remainder of the VPN, after the departure of the ZDS 
platform and creation of the HZDS, transformed itself into an entity with the title 
of ODÚ-VPN (Civic Democratic Union – Public against Violence, Občianská 
demokratická únia – Verejnosť proti násiliu) and began to closely work with the 
ODS, which at this time emerged in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia as a result 
of the disintegration of the OF. The disintegration of the VPN also meant that the 
MNI, formerly part of the VPN, was again independent.
Another result of the breakup of the VPN was a change in the position of strong-
est party in the Slovak party system, which the KDH, with 31 MPs in the Slovak 
National Council, became; the VPN shrunk to less than half its original size with 
a mere 23 of the original 48 MPs (Kopeček 2007: 136). It was for this reason that 
the chairman of KDH and deputy prime minister, Ján Čarnogurský, was named 
the new Slovak Prime Minister on 23rd April 1991, on the basis of an agreement 
between coalition parties. The party structure of the government thus remained 
unchanged; the substitutions affected only those government positions vacated by 
the removals from offi ce and resignations of VPN members representing the ZDS 
17 One of the best known causes is “Tisova vila”. For more see: Lesná 2001: 35.
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platform. Due to the disintegration of the VPN and the departure of the ZDS into 
opposition, the coalition government could no longer rely on its majority within 
the plenary, however it had a majority in a key body – the chair of the Slovak 
National Assembly. No voting within the plenary on an expression of confi dence 
took place; considering the distribution of power it was clear that this government 
would fail without the support of, for example, the Hungarian parties. The entire 
changeover basically took place only as a “reconstruction” of the existing govern-
ment (Kopeček 2007: 308) and the chair of the Slovak National Council, František 
Mikloško (then still under the VPN, a year later he was a member KDH) simply 
informed MPs that the presidium of the parliament had replaced the prime minister 
and certain members of the government.18
The fi rst speech by the newly appointed prime minister, Jan Čarnogurský, on 
the fl oor of parliament was, however, interesting. During his speech he gave his 
opinion on the circumstances which had led to the government crisis and the sub-
sequent replacement of the prime minister and several other ministers. “The cause 
of governmental crisis was a division in the Public against Violence movement, 
which won the parliamentary elections” was how the new prime minister char-
acterised the main problem.19 At fi rst glance he saw nothing strange about it. He 
drew attention to the fact that divisions within formerly cohesive anti-communist 
opposition movements were also taking place in other Central and South-Eastern 
European countries. He specifi cally named the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania 
and Bulgaria. “The common enemy – totalitarian power – is gone, and thus the 
bond of cohesiveness of formerly unifi ed anti-totalitarian movements disappeared”, 
Čarnogurský continued.20 In contrast to the above-mentioned countries, however, 
the new prime minister saw in the case of the division of the VPN a certain differ-
ence. “Nowhere has a victorious movement broken up with such internal contrariety 
and with such a bang as in Slovakia. Nowhere have criminal allegations been made 
against former members of the same movement. The roots of the crisis oscillate be-
tween individual uncertainty and the accusation of others,” said Čarnogurský, add-
ing that after this experience he was beginning to understand “why Slovakia during 
the course if its history was not able to establish its own independent state”.21
The open battle between competing platforms within the VPN and disagree-
ments between members of the government formerly delegated by a unifi ed VPN 
18 SNR 1991, Stenographic minutes of the 13th meeting of the Slovak National Council on 24th 
April1991. In: http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1990snr/stenprot/013schuz/s013001.htm.
19 SNR 1991, Stenographic minutes of the 13th meeting of the Slovak National Council on 24th 
April1991. In: http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1990snr/stenprot/013schuz/s013001.htm.
20 SNR 1991, Stenographic minutes of the 13th meeting of the Slovak National Council on 24th 
April1991. In: http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1990snr/stenprot/013schuz/s013001.htm.
21 SNR 1991, Stenographic minutes of the 13th meeting of the Slovak National Council on 24th 
April1991. In: http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1990snr/stenprot/013schuz/s013001.htm.
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movement were according to Čarnogurský erupting with increasing frequency. “It 
was clear that a government so composed was not able to work with adequate 
effectiveness,” said the new prime minister, adding that all members of the gov-
ernment gradually acknowledged this, “including Prime Minister Mečiar”.22 The 
presidium of the Slovak National Council, which appoints and removes the Slovak 
government according to law, wanted to restore the cabinet’s capacity of action. 
After a series of negotiations with coalition and opposition parties it eventually 
reached the conclusion that it would intervene by reconstructing the government 
rather than calling an early election. No debates were held about the decision of 
the presidium or the fi rst speech given by the new prime minister. There was no 
vote of confi dence, and the reconstructed cabinet did not present any programme 
announcement. Although a change of prime minister is in political science gener-
ally regarded as the formation of a new coalition (Říchová 2000: 119), in practice 
it was almost as if there had merely been an insignifi cant change in personnel and 
continuation of the existing government.
The change of government affected the representation of individual existing 
parties in the cabinet. Since there was no longer an unnecessarily large or even 
a minimal majority coalition, but instead a de facto minority government, the tiny 
DS profi ted most from the change. It became a necessary entity for its coalition 
partners for the stability of the government as a whole. In the new government, 
which again had 23 seats, there were nine representatives of the KDH, nine repre-
sentatives of the ODÚ-VPN/MNI23 and nine members nominated by the DS. The 
representation of the DS in the government therefore almost doubled in comparison 
to the previous cabinet. Čarnogurský’s government gained the tacit support of the 
coalition of two Hungarian parties, which at this time held 14 seats in the Slovak 
National Council (Kopeček 2007: 449).
The problems inside the coalition did not however end with the divisions within 
the VPN. At the start of 1992 a nationalistically oriented platform emphasising the 
positive signifi cance of Slovak statehood from 1939 to 1945 emerged within the 
KDH (Liďák – Koganová – Leška 1999: 56), also appealing for a “more radical 
solution” to the future organisation of Czechoslovakia than had been envisioned by 
KDH chairman Ján Čarnogurský, and which was oriented towards a confederative 
organisation (Kopeček 2000). This platform on 28th March 1992, at the convention 
in Zvolen, transformed into an independent party with the title of SKDH (Slo-
vak Christian-democratic Movement, Slovenské kresťanskodemokratické hnutie). 
22 SNR 1991, Stenographic minutes of the 13th meeting of the Slovak National Council on 24th 
April1991. In: http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1990snr/stenprot/013schuz/s013001.htm.
23 In 1991 the remaining part of the VPN transformed into the ODÚ-VPN, on 28th March 1992 it 
then decided to omit the ‘VPN’ and continued as the ODÚ party. Martin Porubjak became the 
chairman of the party.
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Its ranks were fi lled by four of the nine Christian-democratic ministers and 11 of 
a total of 31 MPs of the Slovak National Council originally elected on the KDH 
ticket, including the vice-chairman of parliament and unsuccessful candidate for 
the leadership of the KDH in 1991 Ján Klepáč24 and roughly a third of the member 
base (Kopeček 2002: 365; Kopeček 2007: 309). Because an election was less than 
three months away, changes to the composition of the government as a result of 
the breakup of KDH were not made. SKDH thus became a coalition party, without 
this relationship being formalised in coalition documents in any way. The KDH 
however considered the actions of its deserters as both coalitional and oppositional. 
A publication released on the occasion of the ten year anniversary of the KDH 
states that on 1st April 1992 Minister Viliam Oberhauser (SKDH) suggested in Slo-
vak parliament to accept the Declaration of the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic, 
“which was in contradiction of coalitional agreements” (Bobula 2001: 45). A KDH 
MP and one of the future members of the SKDH, Anton Hykisch, also presented 
a similar idea in November 1991 (Kopeček 2007: 308–309).
The KDH was weakened by the departure of the SKDH, however Lubomír 
Kopeček saw a certain positive aspect, as the “cohesiveness of the movement was 
strengthened” (Kopeček 2000). A partial rectifi cation of the standing of KDH within 
the government took place a month before the elections, when Minister of Control 
Marián Hvozdík, who was formerly nominated to the government under the VPN, 
joined the movement. Another key fi gure of the former VPN, who joined the KDH 
in the period before the 1992 elections, was chairman of the Slovak National Coun-
cil František Mikloško (10th March 1992), who until that time had represented the 
minority Christian stream within the VPN and later the ODÚ-VPN.
There were also changes of varying levels of intensity among opposition parties 
in the period of 1991–1992. One particular change is worthy of note, because it was 
to play a signifi cant role in the future, including from the point of view of the coa-
litional potential of this entity. The transformation of the KSS into the modern left-
wing Democratic Left Party (SDĽ – Strana demokratickej ľavice) was undoubtedly 
one of the key events of the development of the party system during this period. 
After the fall of communism, the Czech Communist Party (KSČ) faced, among 
other things, pressure to allow the Slovak part of the party a more autonomous 
24 Vice-chairman of the Slovak National Council Ján Klepáč was one of the initiators of the forma-
tion of the SKDH platform, and later new party, and became its fi rst leader.The departure of Ján 
Klepáč’s group did not paralyse the party organs of the KDH, which was still quorate. Of the 113 
memebers of the KDH council, 79 remained, of the 11 members of the presidium of the KDH 
only three left. In the parliamentary election in 1992 the SKDH was not successful (3.1%) and on 
10th October 1992 it merged with the Freedom Party (Strana Slobody) and changed its name to the 
Christian-social Union (KSÚ – Kresťanská sociálna únia). It supported the politics of the HZDS, 
and after a defeat in the 1994 election (2.1%) the KSÚ merged with the SNS. Under the SNS some 
returned to politics in the future. For more see: Bobula 2001: 41–45; Kopeček 2000.
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position. For this reason in November 1990 it acceded to a change in acronym to 
KSČS, the addition of the “S” intending to better refl ect the Slovak element in the 
party, and it further accepted a new organisational structure, under whose umbrella 
the new Czech (KSČM) and Slovak (KSS) entities would be established.
A dispute between KSČM and KSS over the subsequent direction to take con-
tinued, however. The KSS, under the leadership of “reformists” surrounding Peter 
Weiss and Milan Ftáčník started a process of transformation at the end of 1990, 
which involved the renaming to KSS-SDĽ (the addition of the Strana demokratickej 
ľavice – Left Democratic Party suffi x), a programmatic and ideological redefi nition, 
orientation towards Western European socialist and social-democrat structures, join-
ing the Socialist International and a total break in continuity with the pre-November 
Communist Party. This movement did not gain great support within the KSČM, 
and both sides thus began to move away from each other, thereby initiating the 
gradual disintegration of the umbrella structure of the KSČS. An indication of this 
was the establishment of two independent parliamentary groups in the then Federal 
Assembly, from which state of affairs there was merely a small step to the complete 
independence of the KSS-SDĽ. In the meantime the party changed its name again, 
removing the “KSS” part and retaining only the SDĽ (February 1991). During 1991 
there was a gradual distancing from Czech communists, which culminated at a party 
conference in December 1991, which confi rmed the previous reformational devel-
opment under the leadership of Peter Weiss (Kopeček 2007: 184 and 187; Kopeček 
2002: 361). All these steps were in the direction of the post-communists rising out 
of political isolation which they found themselves in after the elections in 1990. The 
impact of the transformation of KSS to the SDĽ in terms of coalitional potential 
only expressed itself after the subsequent elections. With this step the party rid itself 
of the label of an entity opposed to the system (Kopeček 2002: 362).
The federal KSČS offi cially ceased to exist on 23rd April 1992 (Fiala – Mareš – 
Pšeja 2005: 1414–1415), though the SDĽ had not actually been a part of it since De-
cember 1991. The more “conservative” part of the KSS, which did not agree with the 
transformation and supported the maintenance of the original values, split away from 
SDĽ in 1991 and founded an entity with the name of KSS 91. In August 1992 KSS 
91 joined with the Communist Union (Zväz komunistov) to form today’s KSS. Until 
2002, however, the KSS was disassociated with political events in Slovakia. In 2002 
it became a parliamentary party; however in the next elections in 2006 it was again 
not elected to Parliament. Today’s KSS, according to Grigorij Mesežnikov, “propa-
gates theses that attest to its anti-system character” (Mesežnikov 2006).
The parliamentary (opposition) SZ (Green Party, Strana zelených) split on 15th 
February 1992 into the pro-federalist Green Party and the nationalistically ori-
ented Green Party of Slovakia (SZS – Stranu zelených na Slovensku), which in 
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socio-economic issues had shifted to the left of the original SZ (Liďák – Koganová 
– Leška 1999: 60). The fi rst internal confl icts within the Slovak National Party were 
also experienced during this period, in relation to the formation of a position on the 
constitutional organisation and future of Czechoslovakia. There were also disputes 
around the person of the then chairman Víťazoslav Moric (Kopeček 2007: 417–420).
Cleavages
The main cleavages of Slovak political parties do not correspond to prevail-
ing cleavage theories. The classical theory outlined by Seymour Lipset and Stein 
Rokkan defi ned four cleavages that infl uence the likeness of the party system: cen-
tre – periphery, urban – rural, church – state, and owner – worker (Lipset – Rokkan 
1967; for more see also Tusičišny 2003). Though almost all of the above classical 
cleavages have appeared in Slovak political development to a greater or lesser extent 
(Rybář 2003: 278–279), specifi c confl icts, for which Slovak and foreign political 
scientists have been fi nding various designations, have had much more infl uence 
on the party system in Slovakia: liberal democracy and non-liberal conception of 
the regime (Hloušek – Kopeček 2005: 17), possibly between nationalistic-populist 
entities on the one hand and liberal-democratic on the other (Szomolányi 1999: 14), 
authoritarian-power bloc and the consensual-democratic bloc (Szomolányi 1999: 
62), or the more general and simplifi ed division of parties into standard and non-
standard (Lang 1995: 33; Mesežnikov 2002).
The specifi city of this confl ict has developed from the fact that there is no eter-
nal programme or ideological issue, dispute or confl ict at its centre, but rather the 
personality of one person, chairman of the HZDS Vladimír Mečiar, towards whom 
other players in political events (be they individual politicians or parties as such) 
defi ned themselves either positively or negatively. “This is why in the revitalised 
dispute over the form of the regime in Slovak political science terminology the for-
merly journalistic labelling as the confl ict of mečiarism vs. antimečiarism quickly 
became common” (Hloušek – Kopeček 2005: 17). Party politics in Slovakia was 
hence signifi cantly personalised under the infl uence of this dispute, caused by the 
long term function of the charismatic Vladimír Mečiar in Slovak politics (Marušiak 
2006). According to Lubomír Kopeček, Mečiar became an “important dividing line 
that determined the positions of other political entities” (Kopeček 2007: 143), in-
fl uenced the form of the Slovak party system and “all Slovak political formations in 
the 1990s faced the question of whether they were prepared to work with this entity 
(the HZDS)” (Kopeček 2007: 143).
At the start of 1998, still during the controversial government of Vladimír Mečiar, 
Grigorij Mesežnikov characterised this cleavage thus: “The differences between 
government and opposition parties are particularly visible on the level of their 
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distinct understanding of democracy (authoritarianism vs. liberalism, confl ict poli-
tics vs. consensus politics and preference of the values of the individual vs. elevat-
ing the interests of a collective entity)” (Mesežnikov 1998: 93).
This dispute however begins to appear in Slovak politics much earlier than 1998. 
It signifi cantly infl uenced the development of individual political parties and the 
party system itself, essentially from its formation at the start of the 1990s. In the 
fi rst phase in the period from 1989 to 1990, when the party system was taking 
place, this confl ict was not particularly noticeable. In this period political parties 
were only just emerging. Political scientists have identifi ed three types of political 
parties that existed within the party system during this period. The fi rst are those 
that are completely new, without tradition (the KDH, VPN and later their successor 
parties, the HZDS and ODÚ). The second type is parties that after 1989 renewed 
their activities, which had been interrupted during the communist regime (SDSS 
/Slovak Social-democratic Party, Sociálnodemokratická strana Slovenska/, and 
SNS). The fi nal type is those parties that existed in a certain form under the previ-
ous regime (KSS, DS25) and which continued in their activities (Liďák – Koganová 
– Leška, 1999: 30–31). The dominant entity during this period in Slovakia was 
the VPN, a broad-spectrum entity composed of various ideological programme 
streams, whose single connecting idea was opposition to KSČ (and later KSS) and 
to the previous regime (Krivý – Feglová – Balko 1996: 42).
The second phase of the development of the party system is its crystallisation. This 
period is bound by the elections in 1990 and 1992. This was a period in which the 
VPN was divided into two successive entities, part of the KDH was subdivided and 
the KSS was transformed into the SDĽ. It was precisely the division of the VPN that 
was the main sign of the commencement of a new specifi c cleavage of mečiarism 
– antimečiarism. It began with the disintegration of the VPN in spring 1991 and the 
subsequent establishment of the HZDS under the leadership of Vladimír Mečiar 
and – as Hloušek and Kopeček assert – ended at the beginning of 1994. “During this 
period Mečiar’s newly created the HZDS managed to develop an extensive electoral 
base and seize power after the 1992 elections” (Hloušek – Kopeček 2005: 17). For 
the party system itself the period from 1992 to 1994 is characteristic of the so-called 
fi rst dominance of the HZDS. Both then governing parties, the HZDS and SNS, 
however underwent tumultuous intra-party development during this period, which 
resulted in the gradual departure of segments dissatisfi ed with Mečiar’s style of 
governing. With their departure to join the opposition the governing coalition lost its 
majority and in March 1994 also lost a vote of no confi dence in parliament. Hloušek 
25 The DS existed before 1989 under the title of the Slovak Resurgence Party (SSO – Strana sloven-
skej obrody). It originated in 1948 with the transformation of the existing DS to a a satellite party 
of the KSS.
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and Kopeček consider the emergence of a broad coalition lead by Mečiar’s former 
foreign affairs minister, Jozef Moravčík, to be a signifi cant shift in the development 
of the cleavage of mečiarism and antimečiarism. This is because Moravčík’s coali-
tion was a highly heterogeneous grouping including on the one hand the strongly 
anti-communist, conservative and right-wing KDH and on the other the post-com-
munist and left-wing SDĽ. “The bond of the coalition at the given time was a joint 
rejection of the methods of Vladimír Mečiar” (Hloušek – Kopeček 2005: 17–18).
This cleavage then appeared in full force from 1994 to 1998, which is called the 
period of the second dominance of the HZDS. After the early election in autumn 
1994 it became clear that the HZDS had zero potential to form a coalition with the 
parties of Moravčík’s government, which Mečiar solved by the “creation of an 
exceptionally ideologically heterogeneous government” (Hloušek – Kopeček 2005: 
18). Apart from his HZDS this government also contained the extremely national-
istic SNS and the radical left-wing Slovak Workers’ Association (ZRS, Združenie 
robotníkov Slovenska). “This ideological heterogeneity confi rmed the commenced 
trend of the functioning of party competition, which was founded on the revitalised 
dispute over the form of the regime. Both the SNS and the ZRS were prepared 
to accept and participate in a number of controversial steps which characterised 
Mečiar’s government” (Hloušek – Kopeček 2005: 18). The style of politics of the 
HZDS, ZRS and SNS government and its steps to eliminate opponents led a large 
part of the opposition to a temporary consolidation of their power for the purpose of 
defeating the then governing coalition. During this period we can observe the seed 
of future political parties - functioning in the short or long term. The entire period 
is again marked by a polarisation of the political and party system into two opposed 
blocs of “non-standard” and “standard” parties (Lang 1995: 33). The opposition 
was, by the essence of the dispute alone, characterised by a strong antimečiarism. 
Co-operation on the basis of being parties in opposition hence in many regards 
again transcended the classic (traditional) cleavage of political parties. The bond 
uniting opposition activities, including integrational tendencies, was the relation-
ship to Vladimír Mečiar. On this principle, for example, the Slovak Democratic 
Coalition (SDK) was established in 1997. The composition of the government after 
the elections in 1998 confi rmed the presence of this specifi c cleavage. The govern-
ment was put together across the left-right spectrum by parties considered to be 
antimečiarist. “Their main bond became a fear of the return of the HZDS to power 
and the main uniting goal was the removal of the non-liberal results of the previous 
era, the consolidation of the democratic regime and the entry of Slovakia to the 
EU and NATO” (Hloušek – Kopeček 2005: 18–19). This is what held the coalition 
parties together and was among the signifi cantly stabilising elements.
In the period from 1994 to 1998 the role of the nationalistic-ethnic cleavage, 
which had been partially present from the start of the 1990s, also played a key 
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role. The politics of the government composed of the HZDS, ZRS and SNS was 
directed at the Hungarian minority and at in least several cases led to the violation 
of international commitments relating to the protection of minorities. After 1998, 
partially thanks to the engagement of parties representing the Hungarian minority 
in the coalition government alongside Slovak parties, this cleavage ceased to play 
a signifi cant role. It reappears again after 2006, however, when the SNS again be-
comes a part of the coalition government.
Instead of the confl ict between left and right, during the decade after the fi rst 
free elections a confl ict between democracy and authoritarianism prevailed in Slo-
vak politics. This infl uenced, for example, the main competitive relationships on 
the Slovak political scene. Unlike other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, 
for example, the centre-right parties in Slovakia “were defi ned not by their posi-
tion towards the post-communist left but towards authoritarian and nationalistic 
tendencies” (Mesežnikov 2005). According to Hloušek and Kopeček, however, 
after 2000 this cleavage begins to lose signifi cance and vigour. This was caused 
predominantly by new parties which during this period penetrated the party system 
and which begin to present themselves otherwise than by their positive or nega-
tive relationship to Vladimír Mečiar. This particularly applies to the SMER party, 
which “refused the existing division according to the mečiarism – antimečiarism 
cleavage and founded its success on criticism of the steps of Dzurinda’s coalition 
government, primarily in the socio-economic sphere” (Hloušek – Kopeček 2005: 
19), and also to the New Citizen’s Alliance (ANO, Aliancia nového občana) of 
media magnate Pavol Rusko. As Hloušek and Kopeček mention, the HZDS also 
played its own part in this by changing its political strategy, replacing “an effort to 
remove Dzurinda’s coalition government at any price” with a focus on “demon-
strating its political transformation and (partially) distancing itself from the past” 
(Hloušek – Kopeček, 2005: 19).
The party system thus developed into a more standard situation, which was con-
fi rmed by the elections in 2002 and by subsequent development. This is because 
the results of the 2002 elections allowed, for the fi rst time in Slovak post-revolu-
tionary history, the creation of a government identifi able on the left – right scale, 
catering for the approaches of parties to economic and social issues. Although 
the government was in the end composed of parties with relatively similar pro-
grammes, this did not guarantee stability. Internal fragmentation within individual 
parties, orientations on specifi c themes, personal disagreements and the ambitions 
of individual leaders of coalition parties, as well as individual groups within the 
parties themselves, all led to a very unstable government. The government was 
gradually abandoned by factions of two of the four coalition parties, after which 
two entire parties and the prime minister were in the end forced by circumstance 
to call early elections.
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